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THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
LINDSEY COWEN*
INTRODUCTION
Civil disobedience is an emotion-ridden concept; individual responses
to it cover the entire range of human reactions. Senator Sam J. Ervin,
Jr., for example, has stated:
I make an affirmation which is subject to no exception or modifica-
tion. The right of clergymen and civil rights agitators to disobey
laws they deem unjust is exactly the same as the right of the arsonist,
the burglar, the murderer, the rapist, and the thief to disobey the laws
forbidding arson, burglary, murder, rape, and theft.1
Such an approach has been labelled "plainly false,"2 and indeed it
appears that most persons who have written on the subject believe that
under certain circumstances conduct that is illegal, and therefore punish-
able by the state, may nevertheless be morally justified.3 While there is
disagreement on precisely what these circumstances are, most who acccept
the principle at all would agree with Dean Robert B. McKay that at the
very least civil disobedience includes
the violation of law by nonviolent means where opposition to the
law is based on a deeply held conviction that the law itself is in con-
flict with some higher principle. The violation must be open, not
furtive, and any sanction imposed for violation of law must be ac-
cepted, not evaded.4
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Georgia.1 Address by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., University of Georgia Law Day Exer-
cises, May 7, 1966.
'Unpublished paper prepared by Dr. W.T. Blackstone, Professor of Philosophy
and Head of the Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Georgia, for
delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nov.
7-9, 1968.
'The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968); Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36
U. CINN. L. REv. 1, 175 (1967); McKay, Civil Disobedience: A New Credo?, 2
GA. L. REV. 16 (1968); Note, Civil Disobedience in the Civil Rights Movement:
I o What Extent Protected and Sanctioned?, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 711 (1965). Less
formal, but highly readable discussions include: Van Dusen, Civil Disobedience:
Destroyer of Democracy, 55 A.B.A.J. 123 (1969); Civil Disobedience, 21 CORNELL
L.F. 1 (1968); A Center Symposium: Limits of Dissent, 1 THE CENTER MAG.
No. 7, at 3 (1968).
' McKay, supra note 3, at 19.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
There, are, of course, great practical as well as theoretical difficulties
in labeling certain types of illegal conduct as justified ;" but there is sub-
stantial precedent,' and there is no reason to think that society will not
be confronted with these difficulties for an indefinite time in the future.
The lawyer inevitably will play a major role.
Will that role, or any par of it, be different than it otherwise would
be because civil disobedience is involved? The answer requires examina-
tion of the lawyer's role as counselor, advocate, public official, and citizen.
THE LAWYER'S ROLE AS COUNSELOR AND ADVOCATE
The Attorney-Client Relationship
When a lawyer is approached by a prospective client who seeks legal
assistance, he may already be so occupied with the work of other clients
that he is obligated to refuse additional responsibilities.7  Under these
circumstances, he is acting in the best tradition of the profession in limit-
ing himself to that which he can effectively accomplish. But if he feels
that he is in a position to acccept another client, he must determine whether
to accept this particular client. There is, first of all, the possibility of a
conflict of interest, and if the possibility exists he must decline being
retained; all doubts should be resolved against the proposed additional
representation.8
' No matter what it is called or how it is justified or rationalized, civil dis-
obedience demeans democracy's process of social change and eventually
destroys democracy itself. Civil disobedience is a counsel of despair and
defeat, so undemocratic that it could bring about an authoritarian state.
Van Dusen, supra note 3, at 123.
8 Henry David Thoreau, in a sense the "father" of modem-day civil disobedience,
once wrote:
Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, and obey them until we
have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once .... I do not hesitate to
say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually
withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government
of Massachusetts, and not wait 'til they constitute a majority of one, before
they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is enough if they
have God on their side, without waiting for that other one. Moreover, any
man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one already.
H. THOREAU, THE VARIORUm CIVIL DISOBEDIENcE 39, 41 (Harding ed. 1967). See
also note 3 supra.
"The lawyer deciding whether to undertake a case must be able to judge
objectively whether he is capable of handling it and whether he can assume
its burdens without prejudice to previous commitments....
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1158,
1218 (1958).
'ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6 [hereinafter cited as ABA
CANONS].
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Even if there is no conflict, there may be other valid reasons for
refusing. The attorney-client relationship is a peculiarly personal one, and
normally a lawyer has no specific obligation to represent any particular
client.' Nevertheless, the profession as a whole has a responsibility to
provide legal services to those who need them, 10 and this corporate re-
sponsibility ultimately rests with the individual attorney. Consequently, "a
lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment. The fulfillment
of this objective requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered
employment which may be unattractive both to him and to the bar gen-
erally."' ' The individual attorney must weight carefully his right to
refuse employment against the right of a citizen to representation. The
citizen who seeks legal advice must not be denied it, or even unneces-
sarily hampered in obtaining it.'"
Once the attorney-client relationship is established by agreement, the
lawyer's role as counselor or advocate, or perhaps both, comes into play.
The Lawyer as Counselor
In those situations where a client is concerned about a law he believes
to be unjust or immoral, the lawyer should first consider its constitution-
ality. Depending upon the particular circumstances, this may be in effect
no more than a formality, or it may require a major research effort. What-
ever the circumstances, if, after due consideration, counsel deems the act
to be clearly contrary to some provision of the state or federal constitu-
tion, he must advise his client to that effect ;"3 the client may then decide
to act as though the statute were nonexistent.' 4 Regrettably, most issues
of this sort do not permit legal judgments of unconstitutionality that are
substantially without doubt; consequently, in many situations there is a
real possibility that the lawyer's legal judgment may prove to be wrong
0 d. No. 31.
"0 "It is not only the right but the duty of the profession as a whole to utilize
such methods as may be developed to bring the services of its members to those
who need them, so long as this can be done ethically and with dignity." ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 320 (1968). See ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2-Ethical Considerations 1, at 11 (Pre-
lim. Draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
" CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2-Ethical Considerations
26, at 17.12 Id. 1, 24 & 25, at 11, 17.
2'ABA CANONS No. 8; see also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon
7-Ethical Considerations 5, at 78.
1 "[A] legislative act, contrary to the constitution, is not law ... " Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 111 (1803).,
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even though professionally reasonable at the time given." He is obliged
to give his best professional judgment and to counsel the client concerning
the sanctions to be imposed should his judgment prove to be erroneous.10
The client, of course, may not be content to act upon his lawyer's
opinion alone, particularly if the lawyer entertains substantial doubt about
it. To remove such doubts, or for any of a number of reasons, the client
may desire a definite ruling by a court; however, under our legal system,
violation of the particular law, with the attendant risk of the imposition
of sanctions, is necessary to obtain the ruling.' The classic civil dis-
obedient would not hesitate to disobey a law deemed unjust or immoral
and thus initiate a legal challenge, because of the risk of punishment should
the act be held constitutional.' Indeed some believe that violation of a
statute for the purpose of testing its constitutionality does not consti-
tute an act of civil disobedience.'" But if the lawyer's judgment of un-
constitutionality ultimately proves to be wrong, the result for the violator
is the same as it would be for the "pure" civil disobedient."
The difficulties confronting the lawyer-counselor in advising on con-
stitutional issues is well illustrated by the "flag-salute" cases of the early
1940's. The first of these to produce a definitive decision of the United
States Supreme Court2' arose when two school children refused to obey
a local school board regulation requiring the saluting of the national flag
as part of daily school exercises. These children, ages 12 and 10, were
members of a family affiliated with the Jehovah's Witnesses and refused to
salute the flag because of their religious convictions. School officials
ultimately expelled them for their noncompliance. Had their parents
sought legal advice before the refusal to salute, counsel could have told
them that the legal question was a difficult and unresolved one. There
"The volume of reported cases may be the best evidence of the truth of the
statement.
'6 See note 13 supra.
"See, e.g., United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 74 (1946).
There may be exceptional circumstances where such a risk need not be taken. See
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 75 (1953).
" The civil disobedient, by definition, is prepared to accept punishment. See
text accompanying note 4 supra.
" See, e.g., A. FORTAS, supra note 3, at 16. Professor Harrop Freeman has been
quoted as saying: "Some writers have said that if a dissenter is later protected or
vindicated by the highest court, then no civil disobedience is involved. This I
deny." Civil Disobedience, 21 CORNELL L.F. 1, 3 (1968).
" See, e.g., Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The situation is dis-
cussed in A. FoRTAs, supra note 3, at 46.
" Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
[Vol. 47
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were Supreme Court opinions that indicated that the school board regula-
tion might be constitutional,2 but there were others indicating that it was
not.m He would also have had to tell them that the courts were reluctant
to render what appeared to them to be advisory opinions,24 and that they
might have to disregard the regulation and risk punitive action before a
judicial determination could be had.25 Whether he could then appropri-
ately advise noncompliance with the regulation would depend on his best
professional judgment as to the outcome. He might well consider the
chances of success worth the risk.
After the Supreme Court decision in Minersville School District v.
Gobiti,2 6 holding that such a regulation was valid, counsel would be
obliged to advise obedience thereafter, unless he had a reasonable legal
basis for believing that the Court might be prepared to reverse itself, a
step highly unlikely immediately after a definitive ruling. As a matter
of fact, however, the reasonable basis was not long in forthcoming. In
1942, three Justices of the United States Supreme Court2 7 who had joined
in the majority opinion in Gobitis noted: "Since we joined in the opinion
in the Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occasion to state that
we now believe that it also was wrongly decided."2 At this point the
lawyer, consulted on the validity of such flag-salute regulations, could
advise that in all probability they would no longer be held constitutional
and could therefore be safely disregarded. At least he could counsel that
since their constitutionality was in doubt, violation for the purpose of
effecting a judicial test would be appropriate.
Of course the constitutionality of such regulations would make little
difference to Jehovah's Witnesses in practice, since they are committed
to disregard laws they deemed contrary to the laws of God as evidenced
by the Bible. But when the opportunity for reversal of the Gobitis de-
cision presented itself, they quite properly took advantage of it. The trial
court sustained their position and restrained enforcement of a similar flag-
22 Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U.S. 621 (1939); Hering v. State Bd. of
Educ., 303 U.S. 624 (1938) ; Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937).
2 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2 For a general discussion of the problem, see H. M. HART & H. WEcHSLER,
supra note 17, at 75-81.
" See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20310 U.S. 586 (1940).
2" Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy.
8 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942).
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salute regulation.2" The Supreme Court of the United States this time
affirmed30 on the ground that such regulations did violate the Constitu-
tion, saying: "The decision of this Court in Minersville School District
v. Gobitis and the holdings of those few per curiam decisions which pre-
ceded and foreshadowed it are overruled ...."81
Occasionally it is suggested that the Supreme Court appears to be
more willing today than in the past to reconsider precedent and to over-
turn it if such a result seems required by the Constitution. 2 If this be
true, a lawyer today may have sounder ground for counseling activity
that he considers illegal, on the theory that only such activity can bring
about a warranted judicial test. But a lawyer may decide, after careful
consideration of all pertinent authorities, that the constitutionality of
the allegedly unjust or immoral statute is beyond reasonable doubt.
Under these circumstances, too, he would advise his client of the reasons
for his judgment and, where appropriate, of the sanctions the client
would risk if he violates the statute.3 The critical question then would be
" Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va.
1942). In declining to follow the precedent decision of the United States Supreme
Court, the court said:
Ordinarily we would feel constrained to follow an unreversed decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, whether we agreed with it or
not. It is true that decisions are but evidences of the law and not the law
itself; but the decisions of the Supreme Court must be accepted by the lower
courts as binding upon them if any orderly administration of justice is to
be attained. The developments with respect to the Gobitis case, however,
are such that we do not feel that it is incumbent upon us to accept it as
binding authority. Of the seven justices now members of the Supreme Court
who participated in that decision, four have given public expression to the
view that it is unsound, the present Chief Justice in his dissenting opinion
rendered therein and three other justices in a special dissenting opinion in
Jones v. City of Opelika .... The majority of the court in Jones v. City
of Opelika, moreover, thought it worth while to distinguish the decision in
the Gobitis case, instead of relying upon it as supporting authority. Under
such circumstances and believing, as we do, that the flag salute here required
is violative of religious liberty when required of persons holding the re-
ligious views of plaintiffs, we feel that we would be recreant to our duty as
judges, if through a blind following of a decision which the Supreme Court
itself has thus impaired as an authority, we should deny protection to
rights which we regard as among the most sacred of those protected by con-
stitutional guaranties.
Id. at 252-53.
"
0 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
31 Id. at 642.
" See Lloyd, The Supreme Court of the United States: Center of Conflict, 17
SYRACUSE L. REV. 599 (1966).
" ABA CANONS Nos. 8 & 32; see also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL IESPONSIBILITY,
Canon 7-Ethical Considerations 5, at 78.
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whether he might properly advise his client to violate the law in order
to call attention to it-a classic civil disobedience tactic. Under such cir-
cumstances, should he advise disobedience and should his judgment of
constitutionality be correct, he might well be guilty of a crime himself
and subject to punishment for his offense.34 Conviction would also make
him subject to discipline by the bar for unprofessional conduct.3 5 It seems
clear that his professional obligation is to counsel obedience.
After such advice, however, the client may nevertheless decide to
violate the law. If the attorney is told of the decision, the duty to preserve
the client's confidences is no longer effective, and the attorney has a
positive duty to notify the appropriate authorities of the proposed viola-
tion.38 The fact that it may be a case of civil disobedience does not change
his obligation. Such action by counsel, however, should be of no concern
to the true civil disobedient because one of the generally-recognized ele-
ments of civil disobedience is the desire for publicity concerning the
alleged unjust or immoral law, and a willingness on the part of the civil
disobedient to accept whatever punishment that may be imposed.3 7
The lawyer's role, as indicated, is to provide a full legal analysis of
the implications of the proposed violation; to advise against it if his
conclusion is that the law is valid, even though unjust or immoral; and to
notify the authorities if he has reason to believe that the violation will
occur. The client's obligations to his own conscience are not a matter
within the lawyer's professional concern.
The Lawyer as Advocate
When the lawyer is called upon to serve as advocate, he has an obliga-
tion to urge
any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client with-
out regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the
construction will ultimately prevail. His conduct is within the bounds
of the law if the position of his client is supported by the law or is
supportable by a good faith argument for an extension, modification
" For a general discussion of parties to crime, see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
55 (1957).
" ABA CANON No. 32; see also CODE OP PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon
1-Discip. R. 1-102, at 6; Note, Disbarment: Nonprofessional Conduct Demon-
strating Unfitness to Practice, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 489 (1958).
" ABA CANON No. 37; see CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5-
Discip. R. 5-101 (c) (3), at 55; id., Canon 7-Ethical Considerations 4, at 78.
" See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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or reversal ot the law. However, a lawyer should not assert a'position
iri litigation which is frivolous.88
In other words, a client is entitled to have every position reasonably avail-
able to him under the law advanced in his behalf.8" Matters of strategy
may dictate choice, but a lawyer has broad discretion in making his argu-
ment. A civil disobedient, like other disobedients, can expect no more;
but for publicity or other purposes he may wish to have an argument
based upon his motivation presented at his trial. There is analogous
precedent for this. A husband who kills his wife's lover may seek to
defend on the ground that he is avenging his honor and her's, a defense
of dubious legal validity but perhaps of some practical value. The father
who steals food to feed his hungry children may find that, under the cir-
ctlmstances, a jury will refuse to convict him. So a civil disobedient might
hope for an acquittal or a hung jury at the hands of jurors sympathetic
with his cause, or he might be satisfied simply to have the alleged unjust-
ness or immorality of the particular law dramatized in the courtroom.
In the end, the lawyer would have to decide whether to attempt such a
defense; if he attempts it, the presiding judge would have to determine
how far he would permit the advocate to go in this area. Theoretically,
in such circumstances the alleged good motive should be deemed im-
material in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The question of motivation could arise again at the time of the time
of the imposition of sentence, after a guilty plea or a conviction of an act
of civil disobedience. On occasion it has been suggested that the motives
of a civil disobedient ought to be considered in mitigation. The argu-
ment is that a nonviolent act in violation of a statute deemed unjust or
immoral, which was committed for the purpose of testing its validity or
for the purpose of drawing attention to its unjustness, might well merit
reduced or nominal punishment.
Of course, a judge who feels that acts of civil disobedience are of
the same kind and degree as other illegal acts would not be swayed by
any such argument in imposing sentence. Indeed, judges who might
concede the existence of illegal, but nevertheless justified, acts might also
refuse to consider motivation in ascertaining punishment on the grounds
that one of the ingredients of the concept of civil disobedience is that the
"s CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7-Ethical Considerations
4, at 78.
"ABA CANONS No. 15.
[Vol. 47
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civil disobedient expects to receive, and is willing to accept, the punish-
ment provided for his act.
The advocate who seeks to argue the morality of his client's cause
'faces the possibility of having the argument rejected by the court.
Nevertheless, there appears to be substantial support for its pertinence,
at least on the issue of the sentence. °
THE LAWYER'S ROLE AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
Historically, the lawyer has played a significant part in the govern-
ment of our country.4' He is a natural leader, by education a policy maketi
and frequently finds himself a member of a legislature, an official in an
administrative agency, an executive officer in the government, or a judge.4
As an elected official in the legislative or the executive branch of
government, the lawyer, like his lay counterpart, has a formal obligation
to work for the improvement of society. As an executive or administrative
official he does this through the proposal of new legislation or the en-
lightened administration of existing laws. As a legislator he meets this
responsibility by proposing and supporting laws designed to correct in-
justices and to provide increased opportunities for the individual realiza-
tion of potential on the part of a greater number of citizens. His educa-
tion and experience peculiarly equip him to identify problems in our legal
and political structures and to contribute effectively to their solution.
As a judge, whether elected or appointed, his opportunities for creative
work are more limited. The traditional role of the judicial officer is to
apply existing law to ascertained facts and thereafter to render a judgment
in accordance with the law.43 In these more enlightened and realistic
times, it is recognized that judges throughout our history have had, and
continue to have, opportunities to guide the development of the law. 44 On
those rare occasions when a judge has the opportunity to rule upon a new
and novel question of common law,45 his opportunity for creativity is at
its height. More commonly, but still infrequently insofar as the total
" See Note, Sentencing in Cases of Civil Disobedience, 68 CoLuM. L. REv. 1508,
1510 (1968).
"'H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS 11 (1946).
,2 Id. at 12.
"' See 1 W. BLACXSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (1907). For a general discussion,
see E. PATERSON, JTRIsPRUJDENCE 571 (1953).
"See B. CAnozo, THE NATURE oF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); B.
CAmnozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924).
"See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905).
19691-
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
volume of cases is concerned, he has the opportunity to develop new law
by shifting emphasis and treating as controlling aspects of a case that
theretofore have been considered to be of relatively minor importance.
4
This is neither the time nor the place to detail the limits of this awesome
power, but within the relatively narrow confines in which it operates, a
judge can act creatively in the interests of justice and morality. There
is real danger that a judge in his proper concern for justice may exceed
the bounds of his authority. Nevertheless, the conscientious judge should
be constantly on the lookout for those situations in which he may appro-
priately act creatively.47
THE CITIZEN-LAWYER
But it is beyond his roles as counselor, advocate, and public official
that the lawyer has the opportunity to play his greatest role in the area
of civil disobedience. The lawyer is an educated man. Most members
of the bar, or at least most of those who have come to the bar in recent
years, have had four years of undergraduate education and three years
additional education in law school.48 They meet and are engaged with a
wide variety of people and with all types of human problems. They are by
nature leaders. Lawyers have an obligation to use their expertise and
talents outside the typical attorney-client relationship to bring about an
improvement in the administration of justice and, more broadly, the legal
system that has been created to make possible an improved life for us
all.49 Bar associations provide one vehicle for accomplishing these ends;
there are many others including even casual conversations.
Because he is who he is, the citizen-lawyer has an obligation to con-
sider most carefully any and all substantial allegations that particular laws
are unjust or immoral. If he concludes that the charges are unfounded,
then he surely has at least an informal obligation to seek to persuade those
who feel aggrieved that they are wrong. If, on the other hand, he finds
that their charges are well founded, he has a positive moral, and I
believe, a professional obligation to work actively for the correction of
" See B. Cumozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 56 (1924).
" See note 44, supra.
"See generally V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FiNMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN
SOCIETY 642 (1966) ; AALS & LSAT COUNCIL, LAW STUDY AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES, PRE-LAw HANDBOOK 18 (1968).
"' See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpoNSIBILITY, Canon 4-Ethical Considerations
2, at 50.0See V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, supra note 48, at 56.
[Vol. 47
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the law.51 Pending such changes, he has the opportunity of using his
particular talents for conciliation and arbitration in an attempt to achieve
understanding and patience.
But what of the citizen-lawyer who feels compelled personally to
challenge a law he deems unjust or immoral? Assuming that there is a
type of disobedience that, although illegal and punishable, is nevertheless
morally justified, does a citizen who happens to be a lawyer stand on the
same footing as the nonlawyer? Theoretically, the answer may be Yes;
realistically, it is No.
The lawyer, as a professional constantly working with and in the law,
has a greater opportunity than does the layman to rectify allegedly unjust
or immoral laws within the existing legal structure. Accordingly there may
be fewer times when he is justified in resorting to civil disobedience.
Nevertheless, there may come a time when there is no other feasible avenue
open for him. One can conceive of a situation in which a Negro lawyer
is denied his right to vote, either formally or informally, is refusea
admission to the local bar association, is constantly harrassed in his
attempts to speak out concerning his points of view, or is discouraged froth
peaceable assembly to petition the government. There was a time in this
country, not long past, when such conditions did obtain, and lawyers
operating under such conditions were in fact civilly disobedient. Some
would say their acts were justified even though illegal.
Only a few such limitations still exist. By and large, the citizen-lawyer,
like other citizens regardless of race, creed, or color, has equal voting
opportunities and the substantial protections of several Civil Rights
Acts. 2 The times, therefore, when civil disobedience may be justified for
someone, grow fewer and fewer; for the lawyer, they may now be almost
nonexistent. But as people continue to protest laws they deem unjust or
immoral, the lawyer will continue to be called upon to play his role as
counselor and advocate, and to work as a public official and leading citizen
for the union of law and mortality and for equal justice and opportunity
for all.
" See ABA CANONS No. 29; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 8.
" See generally, Civil Rights Act of 1957, 5 U.S.C. § 295-1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
1861; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 1995 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1960, 18 U.S.C.
§§837, 1074, 1509; 20 U.S.C. §§241, 640; 42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1974 (1964); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-(d), 2000
(1964).
